Michigan Supreme Court Rules Sexually Hostile Environment Not Hostile Under ELCRA

In a significant legal ruling, the Michigan Supreme Court recently addressed whether educational institutions can be held vicariously liable under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) for a hostile educational environment created by student-on-student sexual harassment. In a 6-1 decision, the court concluded that the ELCRA does not support such a cause of action, effectively overturning a 2022 Court of Appeals decision.

The case in question, Doe v. Alpena Public School District, involves a series of incidents between two students, referred to as “Jane Doe” and “John Roe.” The students were fourth-grade classmates at a Michigan elementary school. John, who had a speech and language disorder as well as developmental delays, allegedly engaged in inappropriate behavior toward Jane.

Despite multiple interventions by the school, including suspensions and implementing a “no contact” order, the situation escalated, leading Jane to eventually transfer to a private school. Jane’s representative filed a lawsuit claiming the school district was liable for creating a hostile educational environment under the ELCRA.

In 2022, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Jane Doe, asserting that schools exercise sufficient control over students to be vicariously liable for hostile environment claims arising from student-on-student harassment. The court relied on the concept of “in loco parentis,” which suggests that schools act in the place of parents and, therefore, could be held responsible for the actions of their students.

However, the Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the case relied on the interpretation of the ELCRA’s text rather than a broader common-law doctrine. The court found no indication in the statute’s language that the legislature intended to extend vicarious liability to educational institutions for student-on-student harassment. The ruling clarified that the ELCRA does not incorporate the “in loco parentis” doctrine and that the statute’s definition of “employer” does not extend to schools in this context.

The court also noted that, while ELCRA incorporates principles of agency and respondeat superior in employer liability cases, it does not do so for the actions of students. Consequently, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the ELCRA does not support a vicarious liability cause of action against schools for student-on-student harassment.

Justice Richard H. Bernstein dissented, arguing that there was enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the school’s response to the harassment. He believed the case should have proceeded to trial. Justice Megan K. Cavanagh, while concurring with the majority, noted that the plaintiff still had a viable claim for relief under a different section of Michigan Court Rules (MCR 2.116(C)(10)), necessitating further review by the Court of Appeals.

The ruling narrows the scope of liability for educational institutions under Michigan’s civil rights law, potentially setting a precedent that schools cannot be held vicariously liable for student-on-student harassment under the ELCRA. However, the case will return to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the Alpena Circuit Court correctly granted summary disposition on the plaintiff’s claim under a theory of direct liability.

This decision underscores the importance of statutory interpretation in determining the boundaries of legal liability. Ultimately, it may prompt legislative action to address the gaps identified by the court to protect students’ rights within educational environments.